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A synthesis of the Lucas-Prescott island model and the Mortensen- Pissarides matching model of unemployment
is studied. By assumption, all unmatched workers and jobs are randomly assigned to islands at the
beginning of each period and the number of matches that form on a particular island is the minimum
of the two realizations. When calibrated to the recently observed averages of U.S. unemployment and
vacancy rates, the model fits the observed vacancy-unemployment Beveridge relationship very well
and implies an implicit log linear relationship between the job finding rate and the vacancy-unemployment
relationship with an elasticity near 0.5. The constrained efficient solution to the model is decentralized
by a equilibrium outcome in which wages on each island are determined by a modified auction. Although
the efficient solution explains only about 25% of the observed volatility in the U.S. vacancy-unemployment
ratio, an equilibrium outcome in which wages are determined as the solution to a strategic bargaining
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The purpose of the paper is to study a search and matching model that in-
corporates features of both the Lucas and Prescott (1974) and the Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) equilibrium models of unemployment. There are two
essential speci￿cation assumptions: Unmatched workers and jobs search sub-
markets, "islands" in the literature, at random and the number of matches
that form on any particular island is the minimum of the two realizations.1
The solution to the associated social planner￿s problem can be decentralized
by a modi￿ed auction.
The matching process is closely related to the original formulation of
job-worker matching as summarized in the ￿rst chapter of Pissarides (2000).
However, instead of postulating an ad hoc matching function, the essen-
tial assumptions generate an endogenous positive relationship between the
job ￿nding rate and the ratio of vacancies to unemployment (a "reduced
form" matching function) as well as a negative relationship between vacancies
and unemployment (a Beveridge curve). Indeed, given parameters chosen to
match the U.S. average unemployment and vacancy rates observed in the last
six years in the U.S. and a match period length consistent with the average
￿ows into and out of employment in the U.S., the implied Beveridge curve
a n do b s e r v e du n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e se x p l a i n s9 1 %o ft h ev a r i a t i o ni nv a c a n c y
rates observed over that same period. Furthermore, the implicit relationship
between the job ￿nding rate and the vacancy-unemployment ratio is essen-
tially log linear over the relevant range with an elasticity of about 0.48, two
facts consistent with the literature on the estimation of empirical matching
functions reviewed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
When the wage is set ex post at auction on each island, equilibrium
outcomes would be constrained eﬃcient if the matching process were charac-
terized by constant returns to scale in the sense that the expected number of
matches increases in proportion to the average numbers of unmatched work-
ers and jobs per market holding their ratio constant. Although in fact the
speci￿ed matching process exhibits increasing returns, a modi￿ed auction in
which the agents on the short side of the market on any island obtain all of
match surplus decentralizes the eﬃcient solution for reasons anticipated by
Mortensen (1982).
1This quite old ideas has been fruitfully explored in a recent paper by Shimer (2006)
in the case of limited mobility between island.
2Although the constrained eﬃcient solution to the model implies more
volatility that the standard equilibrium matching model analyzed by Shimer
(2005), it still explains only 25% of the observed variation in the vacancy-
unemployment ratio. However, an equilibrium outcome in which wages are
set as the solution to a continual strategic bargaining game played by worker
and employer explains over 80% of the volatility.
2 The Matching Process
In the standard search equilibrium framework, the matching function is a
black box that relates the number of unemployed workers and vacant jobs to
the ￿ow of matches that form. As in Shimer (2006), the relationship between
the match ￿ow and the numbers of unmatched workers and jobs considered in
this paper is the outcome of more primitive assumptions about how matching
takes place. The speci￿cation follows.
The economy is composed of a continuum of workers and employers and
a continuum of islands where exchange takes place. Time is divided into dis-
crete periods of equal length denoted as t =1 ,2,....L e tM and N represent
measures of unmatched workers and unmatched jobs per island respectively
at the beginning of any period. Under the assumption that participants
are randomly assigned to islands, Shimer (2006) demonstrates that the joint
probability that there are i workers and j jobs on any particular island are






As one can easily verify,
∂π(i,j;M,N)
∂M
= π(i − 1,j;M,N) − π(i,j;M,N) (2)
∂π(i,j;M,N)
∂N
= π(i,j − 1;M,N) − π(i,j;M,N).
In other words, the derivative of the probability that there are i workers and
j jobs in any market with respect to the average number of workers (jobs)
per market is equal to the change in the probability induced by the marginal
worker (job) per market.
3Given that the short side determines the match outcome on each island,
the average number of matches created per island is given by






















π(i,j;M,N)=P r {j<i } > 0. (5)
In other words, the partial derivative, FN(M,N), is the share of the islands
with unemployed workers at the end of a period while FM(M,N) is the
fraction of islands with vacant jobs. In this paper, we refer to F(M,N)
as the structural matching function implied by the matching process. A
characterization of its properties follow:
Proposition 1 T h em a t c h i n gf u n c t i o nF(M,N) is increasing and concave
in M and N holding the other constant (FMM < 0 and FMM < 0).F u r t h e r -
more,
















Proof. See the Appendix.
The next result, a corollary of Shimer￿s (2006) Proposition 3, implies that
the matching process exhibits increasing returns.
Proposition 2 A one percent increase in both M and N increases the num-
ber of matches by more than one percent. Formally, the matching function

















Proof. See the Appendix.
Hence, equation (7) and (8) together imply that the matching function is
approximately linearly homogenous when the sum of the number of workers
and jobs per island is large. Still, the following fact and the graph in Figure
1 suggests that the speed of convergence can be slow:

























3 The Beveridge Curve and Matching Func-
tion
The number of unemployed workers, U,a n dv a c a n tj o b s ,V ,a r ed e ￿ned
as those not matched during the period. That is U = M − F(M,N) and












L − U + V
=
N − F(M,N)
L − M + N
(10)
where L ≥ M is the average number of workers per market and L−U+V ,t h e
sum of the number of matched and vacant jobs, is the average number of jobs
per market. Shimer (2006) shows that observations on the unemployment
and vacancy rates tie down the number of unmatched workers and jobs con-
ditional on the total average number of workers per market, L. Furthermore,
v a r i a t i o ni nt h en u m b e ro fu n m a t c h e dj obs induce a negative relationship







Fmn x x , ()
x
Figure 1: Convergence to Linear Homogeneity
6b e t w e e nt h ev a c a n c yr a t ea n dt h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t eg i v e nt h en u m b e ro f
unmatched workers.
Although the number of unmatched jobs at the beginning of a period is a
state variable, it responds over time to changes in the number of unmatched
jobs, induced say by shocks to match productivity. Under the assumption of
random search,
Mt+1 = Ut + s(L − Ut)=Mt + s(L − Mt) − (1 − s)F(Mt,N t) (11)
where s is an exogenous job separation rate. Indeed, in steady state the
number of workers hired and jobs ￿lled is equal to the separations ￿ow,
(1 − s)F(M,N)=s(L − M).
The assumption that all unmatched workers and jobs are randomly as-
signed is easily justi￿ed. Speci￿cally, if all other workers (jobs) that ￿nd
themselves not matched at the end of a period were to stay in their respec-
tive islands, then the chance of ￿nding a job (worker) is the next period is
higher at a randomly selected alternative island. Hence, staying is not a
symmetric non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. However, if all search by se-
lecting an island at random, then the likelihood of matching is the same in
all islands. It is this assumption of continual reallocation that distinguishes
the model studied in this paper from Shimer￿s (2006) mismatch model.
The following strategy for calibrating the model suggests itself: First,
choose the period length and set the value of the separation rate per period
s to its observed average value in the data. Given these numbers and the
observed unemployment rate and vacancy rate averages, use equation (9),
equation (10) and the steady state condition to determine M and N.
The choice of a matching period length is not totally arbitrary. Speci￿-
cally, in the U.S. case the length must be consistent with the fact that the
average duration of an unemployment spell is approximately one quarter
and that the median spell length is considerably shorter. With these facts
in mind, a period length of one month suggests itself as a base line case.
Shimer￿s (2005) estimate of s i s1 0 %p e rq u a r t e ro r3 . 3 3 %p e rm o n t h .T h e
average vacancy rate reported in the JOLTS data over the 72 month pe-
riod from December 2000 to November 2006 inclusive was 2.51% while the
monthly average of standard CPS measure of the unemployment rate over
t h es a m ep e r i o dw a s5.29%. Given these choices, equations (9)-(11) imply
M =1 .145, N =0 .770,a n dL =1 3 .56. These numbers suggest that a
"island" might be interpreted as a ￿rm of about median size which receives
71.145 applicants per month seeking jobs that become available with frequency
0.770 per month. When evaluated at these values, the sum of the elasticities
of F(M,N), a measure of the degree of increasing returns, is 1.458.
The data on vacancy and unemployment rates over the last six years are
plotted as the scatter of points illustrated in Figure 2.2 The plot represents a
well de￿ned empirical Beveridge curve. The vacancy-unemployment relation-
ship obtained by varying N between 0.75 and 0.95 is illustrated as the solid
curve in the ￿gure. As anyone can see, the ￿t of the model is remarkable.
Indeed, the percent of variance in the vacancy rate explained by the curve
implied by the model and the unemployment rate is 91%.
The slope of the model￿s Beveridge curve is relatively invariant to choices
of the length of the matching period within the range consistent with ob-
served unemployment durations. This fact is illustrated in Figure 3 where
the implied relationship between the vacancy and unemployment rate are
drawn under the assumption that the period length is a quarter and a week
as well as a month.
Of course, Shimer￿s (2006) mismatch model can also explain the recent
time series data on unemployment and vacancy rates. In that model, the
labor market is viewed as a collection of segmented markets for diﬀerent
occupations and regions. Given this interpretation, he argues that cross
market mobility is quite small or non-existent. In this environment, the
total number of workers per island (L in our notation) is M which he regards
as ￿xed. He calibrates his model by setting M and N to match observed
vacancy and unemployment rate averages and then varies N holding M ￿xed
to generate a Beveridge curve.
The job ￿nding rate, de￿ned as the ratio of the hires ￿ow to the number of
unemployed workers, is an empirical measure of unemployment spell hazard.
As documented in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), the empirical literature
on the matching function suggests that the job ￿nding rate is well described
as a log linear function of the vacancy-unemployment ratio with a elasticity
in the range of 0.3 to 0.5.
In the model under study, the measured job ￿nding rate corresponds to
the ratio of the number matched per period to the number unemployed,
F(M,N)/U, and the observed vacancy-unemployment ratio is V/U.As both
2The vacancy rates are from the monthly U.S. job opening rate, total non-farm, series
from JOLTS for December, 2000, to November 2996, and the unemployment rates are the
CPS unemployment rate, non-farm series for the same months.























Figure 2: U.S. Beveridge Curve 12/2000-11/2006 (Sources: JOLTS and BLS)
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Figure 4: "Reduced Form" Matching Function
increase as N increases, a positive implicit relationship exists between the
two variables, one that Shimer (2006) calls the "reduced form" matching
function. Indeed, the log-log relationship obtained when N varies between
0.75 and 0.95, the same range used to generate the model￿s Beveridge curve,
is illustrated in Figure 4. Obviously, the relationship is very close to linear
over this range. Furthermore, the slope (elasticity) is 0.481,an u m b e rw i t h i n
the Petrongolo-Pissarides "plausible range".3 Hence, the model provides a
simple micro foundation for the empirical matching functions estimated in
the literature.
3Although Shimer￿s mismatch model also implies a nearly log linear relationship, his
implied elasticity is only about 0.2.
114 The Social Planner’s Problem
The planner takes the random search by participants as given but can set the
number of unmatched jobs in each period subject to a cost, c, the same cost
that an employer would face. Assume that workers and employers are risk
neural and discount future income by the factor β ∈ (0,1) per period. A job-
worker match produces market output of value p per period and the home
production of any unmatched worker during a period has value z. Obviously,
gain from trade requires that p>z .
The assumed sequence of events within a period follows: In the ￿rst sub-
period, matching takes place. In the second subperiod, all matches produce.
Job separations take place and the number of unmatched jobs to be posted
in the period t +1is determined in the ￿nal subperiod of t.
As employment is equal to Et = L−Ut, the law of motion for employment
is
Et+1 − Et = L − Ut+1 − Et = L − Mt+1 + F(Mt+1,N t+1) − Et (12)
= F(L − (1 − s)Et,N t+1) − sEt
by equation (11) where Nt+1 i st h en u m b e ro fj o b sp o s t e da tt h ee n do f
period t.In each period, the planner chooses a job entry strategy, a function
of the state of the market as re￿ected in the current value of employment,
that determines the number of unmatched jobs that will participate in the
matching process at the beginning of the next period.
Given agent preferences, a benevolent planner chooses a strategy that
maximizes the present value of aggregate match surplus net of recruiting
costs. Since the match surplus ￿ow is p−z, the Bellman equation associated
with this dynamic programming problem is
V (Et)=m a x
N≥0
{(p − z)Et − cN + βV((1 − s)Et + F(L − (1 − s)Et,N))}.
The ￿rst order condition is
c = βFN(L − (1 − s)Et,N)λt+1 (13)
where
λt ≡ V
0(Et)=p − z + β(1 − s)[1− FM(L − (1 − s)Et,N)]λt+1 (14)
12represents the present value of a job-worker match. In other words, the
cost of posting an unmatched job is equal to the product of the job￿s mar-
ginal contribution to the total number of matches in the next period and
the present value of a job-worker match. Because FNN < 0, the second or-
der necessary condition is satis￿ed. The solution to the planner￿s problem
solves the ￿rst order condition, equation (13), the system of diﬀerence equa-
tions de￿ned by equations (12) and (14), and the transversality condition
lim→∞ λt(1 + r)−t =0 .
The existence of at least one steady state solution to the problem can
be demonstrated with the following argument. First, solve the free entry
condition, equation (13), for N as a function of λ and E. Since FN(M,N) is
increasing in M and decreasing in N from (6) and (5), the solution for the
average number of unmatched jobs posted per island, denoted as N(λ,E),
is positive for any λ>0,i si n c r e a s i n gi nλ and is decreasing in E.S i n c e
F(M,N) is positive and increasing in both of its arguments, it follows from
equation (12) and the properties of N(λ,E) that the singular curve repre-
senting the steady state condition ∆E = Et+1 − Et =0can be represented
by a strictly positively sloped curve relating λ and E as represented in phase
diagrams illustrated in Figures 5. Finally, as the right hand side of (12) is
decreasing in Et,E t+1 − Et < (>)0 to the right (left) of the singular curve
as indicated by the direction arrow in the phase diagram.
Because FM(M,N) is a probability by (4), the curve de￿ned by ∆λ =
λt+1−λt =0 , the solution to λ =( p−z)/[1−β(1−s)[1− FM(L − (1 − s)E,N(λ,E))],
is bounded above by (p − z)/[1 − β(1 − s)] and below by p − z.T h i s f a c t
and the properties of the ∆E =0singular curve imply that the two singular
curves must intersect at least once in the positive quadrant if p − z>0.
Because the coeﬃcient on λt+1 on the right side of equation (14) is strictly
less than unity, ∆λ>(<)0 at points above (below) the curve as indicated by
the directional arrows in the phase diagrams portrayed in Figures 5. Finally,













may be positive. Hence, the singular curve representing the condition ∆λ =0
can also has a positive slope as illustrated in Figures 5.
Although it might appear that multiple steady states can exist, in fact
13there is only one.4 The assertion can be established by using the steady
condition ∆λ =0to eliminate λ in the ￿rst order condition. The result is
c =
βFN(L − (1 − s)E,N)(p − z)
1 − β(1 − s)[1 − FM(L − (1 − s)E,N(λ,E))]
.
This condition de￿nes a negatively sloping relationship between E and λ
given the properties of the partial derivatives of F(N,M) reported in Propo-
sition 1. Of course, a steady state is the single solution pair at the intersection
of this curve and the positively sloped relationship de￿ned by ∆E =0 .
Finally, because the steady state is a saddle point, there is a unique path
converging to it from any initial condition as illustrated in Figure 5. Because
any other solution trajectory violates the transversality condition, the con-
verging trajectory represents the unique solution to the planning problem
associated with the initial stock of unmatched workers inherited from the
past.









Phase Diagram: Planner￿s Problem
5 Auction Equilibrium
Suppose that the wage on each island are determined as the outcome of an
auction as in Lucas and Prescott (1974) and Shimer (2006). Speci￿cally,
assume that the worker collects the entire match surplus if there are more
jobs than workers on her island but receives only her reservation wage if
the number of workers exceeds the number of jobs available. Although the
auction outcome is indeterminate when the number of workers and jobs are
equal, suppose for now that the employer obtains the surplus in this case.
Shimer (2006) shows that these assumptions yield outcomes that are
equivalent to the planner￿s solution in his "mismatch" model. However, in
his model there is only one margin, the free entry condition. In this model,
the worker￿s reservation wage as well as the free entry condition characterize
15an optimal solution. Consequently, the auction equilibrium is eﬃcient only
under the counter factual condition that the expected number of matches
that form is homogenous of degree one in the number of unmatched jobs and
workers. Although this requirement holds approximately when the average
numbers of unmatched jobs and workers per market are large, the calibration
presented above does not have this property. However, a relatively simple tax
and subsidy system does exist that will decentralize the planner￿s problem.
The proofs of these assertions follow.
As the probability that there are i workers and j jobs in the same island
from the point of view of any job on a particular island is equal to the
probability that i workers and j−1 other jobs are also assigned to the island,
an employer can expect to obtain the entire match surplus with probability













by equation (5). An alternative way to obtain the same result is to realize
that the relevant probability is equal to the expected number of jobs that
are matched in markets with weakly fewer jobs than workers divided by the














A saw o r k e rr e c e i v e st h es u r p l u so n l yi fm a t c h e do na ni s l a n dw i t hf e w e r
workers than jobs, an analogous argument and equation (4) imply that the




















j=1 π(j −1,j;M,N) is the probability that there is one fewer other
workers than jobs on the island.
16The present value of employment to a worker originally matched on an
island with fewer unmatched workers that unmatched jobs, denoted Yt,i s
the solution to
Yt = p + β [(1 − s)Yt+1 + s[Pt+1Yt+1 +( 1− Pt+1)Ut+1]]
where Ut+1is the value of search and Pt+1 = P(Mt+1,N t+1)=P(L − (1 −
s)Et,N t+1) i st h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fb e i n gm a t c h e do na ni s l a n dw i t hf e w e rw o r k -
ers in the next period. In addition to the current ￿ow of match product, the
worker can expect to receive the total value of her match in the next period
if either her current match continues or the match ends at the end of the
current period but she is rematched on an island with fewer workers than
jobs in the next period. This second possibility is a consequence of the fact
that a worker can move directly from one job to another without a spell of
unemployment.
As the value of unemployed search solves
Ut = z + β[Pt+1Yt+1 +( 1− Pt+1)Ut+1]
and the value of an unmatched job is zero in equilibrium, the surplus value of
am a t c h ,t h ed i ﬀerence St = Yt −Ut, is the solution to the Bellman equation
St = p − z + β(1 − s)[1 − P(L − (1 − s)Et,N t+1)]St+1. (16)
Finally, the free entry condition requires that the cost of posting a vacancy
now equals its expected future return, the product of the present value of the
match surplus and the employer￿s chance of receiving it in the next period.
In other words, the number of unmatched jobs solves
c = βQ(L − (1 − s)Et,N t+1)St+1. (17)
An equilibrium is any solution to equations (12), (16) and (17) that satis￿es
the tranversality condition limt→∞ β
tSt =0 .
A comparison of the equilibrium conditions, equations (17) and (16) ,
with the necessary conditions for a solution the planner￿s problem, equations
(13) and (14) respectively, implies that the equilibrium solution is a candidate
solution to the planner￿s problem if and only if the surplus value of a match
is equal its shadow value in the eﬃcient solution, i.e., St = λt for all t.
However, equations (14) and (16) together with equation (15) imply that
P(Mt+1,N t+1) <F M(Mt+1,N t+1). As a consequence, the private return to
17posting a vacancy generally exceeds the social return implying that that the
market over invests in job creation relative to the eﬃcient solution.










is the probability that there are strictly few jobs than workers. In this case,
the private and social surplus value of a match are equal since P(M,N)=
FM(M,N), but too few unmatched jobs are created because Q(M,N) <
FN(M,N).
These facts imply that the following tax and subsidy scheme will imple-
ment the eﬃcient solution: Provide both parties with the full surplus value
of a match when the number of unmatched workers and employers on an
island are exactly equal and ￿nance the subsidy with a lump sum tax levied
on the workers, employed or not.5 In this case, P = FM and Q = FN which
implies St = λt and c = βFMλt+1. Of course, the transfer required in each
period, equal to
Tt = FMN(L − (1 − s)Et,N t+1)St+1, (18)
vanishes as the number of unmatched workers and jobs become large as a
consequence of equation (7).
6 Bargaining Equilibrium
Suppose that the wage is determined as the outcome of a strategic non-
cooperative bargaining game played after worker and employer meet along
the lines outlined by Hall and Milgrom (2005). Hall and Milgrom argue that
delay rather than search is the relevant default option so long as both sides
receive at least the value of continued search. Assuming that the worker can
g e n e r a t ev a l u ea tt h e￿ow rate z while bargaining but neither can search
for an alternative until next period, the unique perfect wage outcome of a
symmetric alternating oﬀer game is given by







(p − z),R t
¶¶
(19)
5In other words, allocating the match surplus to the side responsible for forming the
match, which is both when the numbers on the two sides of the market are equal, imple-
ments the eﬃcient solution as pointed out in Mortensen(1983).
18In other words, the pair split the ￿ow surplus, p − z, equally provided that
the result exceeds the ￿ow value of the worker￿s search option, Rt.
Because the value of a ￿lled job to the employer is the present value of
the pro￿t ￿ow and the ex ante probability of ￿l l i n ga n yj o bi nt h em a t c h i n g
process is the ratio of the matching rate to the number of unmatched jobs
a tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft h ep e r i o d ,t h ef r e ee n t r yc o n d i t i o ni s
c =
F(L − (1 − s)Et,N t+1)
Nt+1
βJt+1, (20)
where Jt+1 is the employer￿s value of a match in the next period. The em-
ployer￿s value evolves according to the rule
Jt = p − wt + β(1 − s)Jt+1. (21)
Provided that match output exceeds the opportunity cost of employment,
p ≥ z, and the worker￿s wage is no less then the reservation wage, z + 1
2(p −
z) ≥ Rt,t h ew a g ei swt = z+ 1




+ β(1 − s)Jt+1. (22)
Obviously, the singular curve characterizing ∆J =0is the horizontal line
de￿ned by J =
(p−z)/2
1−β(1−s) in Figure 7. Furthermore, because 0 <β (1−s) < 1,
the diﬀerence equation is unstable forward in time as indicated in ￿gure by
the directional arrows.
The solution to the free entry condition, equation (20), for the number of
unmatched jobs, denoted as N(J,E),i n c r e a s e sw i t hJ and decreases with E
F(M,N) is increasing in both arguments and is concave in N.T h el o c u so f
points for which ∆M = Mt+1 − Mt =0is de￿ned by
s(L − M) − (1 − s)F(L − (1 − s)E,N(J,E)) = 0
is a positively sloped relationship between J and E as illustrated in Figure
7. Since ∆E>0(< 0) for all E to the left (right) of the singular curve
characterizing ∆E =0 , a unique saddle point steady state solution exists,
coincident with the ∆J =0curve, which is the only solution to the diﬀer-
ential equation system de￿ned by the necessary conditions and tranversality
conditions. Furthermore, the state value of employment is positive if p − z







Figure 5: Phase Diagram: Bargaining Equilibrium
20We conclude the section by verifying the supposition that the worker￿s
participation condition, wt =
p+z
2 ≥ Rt, never binds. The value of worker￿s
value of a match solves
Wt+1 = wt+β
·
(1 − s)Wt+1 + s
·µ
F(L − (1 − s)Et,N t+1)





F(L − (1 − s)Et,N t+1)
(L − (1 − s)Et
¶
given that workers who lose their job at the end of period t can ￿nd a new one
at the beginning of period t+1 with probability equal to F(Mt+1,N t+1)/Mt+1.
As the worker￿s value of unemployment solves
Ut = z+β
·µ
F(L − (1 − s)Et,N t+1)





F(L − (1 − s)Et,N t+1)





the surplus value is
Wt − Ut = wt − z + β(1 − s)
µ
1 −
F(L − (1 − s)Et,N t+1)
(L − (1 − s)Et
¶
(Wt+1 − Ut+1)
Since the reservation wage Rt is the wage that equates the value of employ-
ment and unemployment, it follows that
Rt = z + β(1 − s)
µ
1 −
F(L − (1 − s)Et,N t+1)
(L − (1 − s)Et
¶
(Rt+1 − wt+1)
= z + β(1 − s)
µ
1 −
F(L − (1 − s)Et,N t+1)














7L a b o r M a r k e t V o l a t i l i t y
Shimer (2005) argues that the standard equilibrium matching model can
explain at most 10% of the observed volatility in the ratio of vacancies to
unemployment. In this section, I show that the eﬃcient solution to the island
matching model can explain only about 25% of the volatility given reason-
able parameter values if productivity and separation shocks are suﬃciently
persistent.6 However, the bargaining equilibrium model explains 88% of the
volatility.
6In his more recent paper, Shimer (2006) also shows that his model of mismatch un-
employment does much better in this dimension.
21One implication of matching models that diﬀerentiate them from Shimer￿s
(2006) mismatch model is that shocks to the match separation or job destruc-
tion rate, s, induce variation in both vacancies and unemployment as well as
shocks to productivity, represented in the model by the parameter p.I nt h e
eﬃcient solution case, the steady state values of the number of unmatched
workers and jobs, M and N, are determined by the following equations:
c =
βFN(M,N)(p − z)
1 − β(1 − s)[1 − FM(M,N)]
(free entry). (23)
F(M,N)=s(L − M + F(M,N)) (steady state). (24)
Without loss of generality, one can normalize the base line value of match
productivity per period at p =1 . Given the normalization, c and z are ex-
pressed in units of output per period. Given a period length of one month,
reasonable values of the interest rate and separation rate are r =0 .004 and
s =0 .033. In his papers, Shimer (2005,2006) sets the opportunity cost of em-
ployment, z, equal to 0.4 (40% of market output). Hagadorn and Manovskii
(2005), Hall (2006), and Mortensen and NagypÆl (2006) argue for larger val-
ues. As in the last of these papers, I set z =0 .7.B e c a u s eM,N ,and L are
determined by the steady state condition and the observed average values
of the unemployment and vacancy rates over the 12/2000 to 11/2006 period
as discussed above, the free entry condition evaluated at these bench mark
values can be use to tie down the cost of vacancy posting. The implied value
is c =0 .485, equal to about two week of match output. Given all these
parameter values, one can now use equations (23) and (24) to compute the
responses of all the endogenous variables to variation in both the productivity
and separation rates.
The central variable of interest in the literature on labor market volatility
is the vacancy-unemployment ratio. At the baseline parameter values, the
elasticity of the steady state value of the ratio with respect to p, computed
using equations (23) and (24), is 4.561.7 This measure of the response to
productivity variation is somewhat larger than the value of 3.43 obtained
using the version of the canonical matching model studied by Shimer (2005)
7This is a comparative static result, and as such, is not the response one would see to
a persistent but transitory shock under rational expectation. However, the evidence in
Shimer(2005) suggest that productivity shocks are nearly permanent, a fact that justi￿es
the use of the number as an approximation to the dynamic response.
22and the same parameter values and much larger than the 1.72 number ob-
tained when Shimer￿s choice for the opportunity cost of employment z =0 .4
is assumed.
As Mortensen and NagypÆl (2007) argue, the elasticity of the vacancy-
unemployment ratio with respect to p is not the only parameter needed to
explain volatility given that separation shocks also occur and are known to
be negatively correlated with productivity shocks as documented by Shimer
(2005). The computed value of the elasticity of the vacancy-unemployment
ratio with respect to s is only −0.126. Given the elasticities of the vacancy-
unemployment ratio and the standard deviation of log productivity (σp =
0.02), the standard deviation of the log of the separation rate (σs =0 .075),
and the correlation between the two (ρps = −0.524) computed from U.S.
post WWII data reported in Shimer (2005), the implied standard deviation












where θ = V/U represents the ratio of vacancies to unemployment and ηθx is
the elasticity of θ with respect to x. This number is about 25% of the standard
deviation of the vacancy-unemployment ratio (σθ =0 .382) in Shimer￿s data.
The worker￿s ￿ow value of search, R, is procyclic because both the ex-
pected wage and the probability of becoming employed increase with produc-
t i v i t ya n dd e c r e a s ew i t ht h es e p a r a t i o nr a t ei nt h ee ﬃcient solution to the
model. To see this point, note that one can write the free entry condition in
the eﬃcient solution case as
c =
FN(M,N)(p − R)
1 − β(1 − s)
where
R = z +
FM(M,N)(1 − s)(p − R)
1 − β(1 − s)
is the worker￿s reservation wage. Given that FN(M,N), the probability of
strictly fewer workers than jobs on an island, is decreasing in N and that
M is ￿xed, at least in the short run, the direct eﬀect of an increase in p
is an increase in N. The reservation wage rises with p both directly and
because the probability of being on the short side of the market increases
with N. Similarly, the reservation wage falls with s. Hence, the response in
23the reservation wage dampens the eﬀects of shocks on unemployment and
vacancies as in the standard model.
When the wage is the outcome of a continual non-cooperative bargaining
game over current match output as characterized by Hall and Milgrom (2005),
Ih a v es h o w na b o v et h a tt h ew a g ei si n d e p e n d e n to ft h er e s e r v a t i o nw a g e .
Hence, it follows from equations (19) - (21) that the equilibrium solution is
demand determined. Speci￿cally, because
wt = z +
1
2




1 − β(1 − s)
,





2β(1 − s)(p − z)
1 − β(1 − s)
for all t.
The response elasticities to shocks in both p and s are much diﬀerent
than those implied by the eﬃcient solution because the wage is less respon-
sive to productivity shocks. Indeed, at the baseline parameter values, the
elasticity of the vacancy-unemployment ratio with respect to p is 9.169 and
with respect to s is −2.714. Given these values and Shimer￿s (2005) statistics
σp =0 .02,σs =0 .075, and ρps = −0.524, the implied standard error of the












Hence, the model explain 88% of the observed value Shimer reports.
8C o n c l u s i o n
The implications of the aggregate matching process implied by assuming that
unmatched worker and jobs randomly search islands in every period and that
the match ￿ow on each island is equal to the minimum of the two realized
values is studied in the paper. When the model is calibrated to match the
average unemployment and vacancy rates over the last six years in the U.S.,
the model ￿ts well the observed negative relationship between the vacancy
and unemployment rates (Beveridge curve) observed over the same period.
Furthermore, the implies relationship between the job ￿nding rate and the
vacancy-unemployment ratio is log linear with elasticity within the plausible
24range reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). In other words, the
matching process generates a "reduced form" matching function with the
properties found in the empirical literature.
When the matching process is embedded in a standard model of equi-
librium unemployment, I show that the solution to the planner￿s problem
can be implemented by a modi￿ed auction. Namely, if the worker (job) is
allocated the entire match surplus when the total realized number of workers
(jobs) on any island is less than or equal to the number on the other side of
the market, then a search equilibrium is socially eﬃcient as anticipated by
Mortensen (1982).
Finally, the eﬃcient solution to the model explains about 25% of the ob-
served volatility in the ratio of vacancies to unemployment in the U.S. as
reported by Shimer (2005). However, an alternative equilibrium outcome
obtained when the wage is determined by continual strategic bargaining be-
tween the worker an employer explains 88% of the volatility.
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269 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 1
























































































































27An application of the limit operator in Mathcad yields limx→∞ FMN(x,x)=
0.


















Since the de￿nition implies
∂x
∂ lnM
= −
µ
FM(M,N) −
F(M,N)
M
¶
and
∂x
∂ lnN
= −
N
M
FN(M,N),
it follows that
MFM(M,N)
F(M,N)
+
NFN(M,N)
F(M,N)
− 1
=
N
F(M,N)
∞ X
i=1
π(i,i − 1;M,N)=
N
F(M,N)
∞ X
i=1
e−(M+N)MiN i−1
i!(i − 1)!
=
P∞
i=1
e−(M+N)iMiN i
i!i! P∞
i=1
e−(M+N) min(i,j)MiN i
i!i!
= FMN(M,N)
E{i|i = j}
E{min(i,j)}
.
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